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FEDERAL MINERAL POLICY:
THE GENERAL MINING LAW OF 1872
ROBERT C. ANDERSON

This paper evaluates economic aspects of the discovery process on
open Federal lands. The discovery of hardrock minerals is regulated
by the General Mining Law of 18721 which allows prospectors open
access on unclaimed, open public domain lands in the Western United
States. The criteria used for evaulating alternative procedures for the
discovery of minerals include equity, efficiency, and administrative
feasibility. Equity considerations, involving the distribution of income
and wealth among present as well as future generations, center on
issues such as the timing of discovery and development, and the
allocation of economic rents between private and public ownership.
Economic efficiency, satisfied when a given output is achieved at least
cost to society, is violated when the search for minerals involves
unnecessary and unproductive expenditures, and when the costs of
environmental disruption resulting from mineral exploration and
production are not incorporated in mining firms' decisionmaking.
Administrative feasiblity refers to monetary and non-monetary costs
incurred by administrators and those subject to the regulations.
Present policy is deficient for several reasons. There is no centralized management over the timing of exploratory effort. The discovery process rewards exploration by giving away valuable mineral
assets rather than offering exploration rights for sale by competitive
bid. Although appropriate incentives exist for individuals to produce
so as to maximize the present value of economic rents, few if any of
these rents accrue directly to the federal treasury. Additionally, the
taxation system that does exist serves in part to distort private
incentives away from maximization of the rent accruing to all of
society. Because of open access there is excessive exploration and the
last prospectors to join the hunt for minerals do not contribute as
much to society as they could in alternative forms of employment. A
second form of inefficiency is created by the legal system under which
claims are filed, and a third from the failure to internalize the costs of
environmental disruption. Although accumulated experience has
* Institute Fellow, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C. This paper benefited
from advice and criticism from Ernest Horn, Laurence Sher'y, Richard Spiegelman, Stephen
Andersen, and an anonymous referee.
1. 30 U.S.C. §§521-31 (1970).
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demonstrated the feasibility of the General Mining Law, costs
incurred by the Department of the Interior in challenging the validity
of mining claims and those incurred by the mining industry to defend
challenged claims have been substantial, judging by the volume of
litigation recorded over the past one hundred years. In addition to the
costs, the fact that the Department of the Interior has no records of
who claims which parcels of land or of the extent of mining
operations following the issuance of mineral patents indicates that the
Mining Law leaves much to be desired administratively.
THE DISCOVERY PROCESS
The image of the sourdough prospector coaxing his burro through
the untamed West is exaggerated today. Today's prospector may
drive a Jeep, have access to modern seismic data and other
geophysical information, and possess other new prospecting tools. He
may be self-employed, 2 but more often works for the mineral
exploration arm of a major mining company. The lure of a big strike
continues to attract individuals into this employment out of proportion to the wages to be earned. Despite the attractiveness of risky
propositions to certain individuals, incentives for lone prospectors are
diminishing rapidly. Recent developments in capital intensive forms
of exploration, such as diamond drilling, airborne magnetic surveys,
and chemical assays of aquifers by the larger mining companies have
largely supplanted individual effort as a source of new discoveries.
Mining rights on most public domain lands, as distinguished from
acquired lands which have been obtained through purchase or
acquisition from private individuals, are obtained through discovery
and development. Exploration proceeds without restraint until a
showing of valuable minerals is obtained. At that point a prospector
can stake a claim for mineral rights under the Mining Law of 1872.
The requirement of a valuable showing is relevant to maintaining a
claim only when the validity of the claim is challenged, and the vast
majority of claims eventually prove worthless from the standpoint of
mineral production. 3 Claims can be of four types: lode claims which
2. According to the Office of Technology, Mineral Accessibility on Federal Lands, 4-5,
(March, 1976 interim report), approximately 100 such prospectors remain today.
3. See R. Hansen, The Mining Law: A Brief Primer for the Layman, for a more thorough
treatment of the Mining Law in operation, as well as a discussion of legislation preceding the
1872 Law. The ultimate use of mining claims was a point of interest in a recent GAO study.
Visits to 240 randomly selected mining claims and 93 patented claims issued within the past 25
years indicated that mining was taking place on only one of the claims and seven of the
patented sites. Of the patented sites 66 were not being used and 20 were in use for purposes
totally unrelated to mining. See GAO, Modernization of the 1872 Mining Law Needed to
Encourage Domestic Mineral Production, Protect the Environment, and Improve Public Land
Management, Gov. Doc. No. GA 1.13:M66/6, (1974).

July 19761

FEDERAL MINERAL POLICY

follow along a vein of mineralization, placer claims on a 20-acre
rectangular parcel, tunnel sites, and mill sites on 5 acres of
non-mineral land. To date more than 6 million claims are thought to
have been filed, many of which have been abandoned. To maintain a
valid claim at least $100 worth of effort must be sustained in each
year. Under the Mining Law a claim may be voided by a subsequent
prospector or the Department of the Interior if the $100 of annual
effort cannot be proven by the claimant. The effort requirement has
been criticized because it is all too often satisfied by the claimant
making purposeless scars on the land. In cases where overlapping
claims have been filed or boundary designations are subject to dispute,
litigation in state courts often ensues.
Surface rights to a mining claim may be obtained through
patenting a claim, which is a long and expensive process. The
requirements include payment of a fee of $2.50 per acre for placer
claims or $5.00 per acre for lode claims, and evidence of the
possibility of profitable recovery of minerals. Approximately 64,000
patents covering some 2.9 million acres have been granted since 18724
(see Figure I). Patenting confers several definite advantages to the
owner of a mining claim including fee ownership of the land, the
elimination of possible challenges from other claimants or
governmental agencies, and increased ease of financing through
outside sources. But patenting also has a distinct disadvantage. The
patenting process involves both procedural and substantive requirements, and a claim is invalidated if it is determined that the
requirements have not been satisfied. A patent applicant thus faces
the real risk of losing his claim should the patent be denied.
In the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act 5 certain minerals, primarily coal,
oil and gas, were excluded from disposition under the Mining Law. By
1973 some 68 million acres of Federal lands were under lease for oil
and gas and about 800,000 acres were under lease for coal.6 The
Material Disposal Law of 19477 and its extension, the Multiple
Surface Use Act of 19558, excluded several common materials such as
sand, gravel, pumice, and clay from location under the Mining Law
and provided for their sale at fair market value.
The main difference in the three mechanisms for mineral develop4. Statement by R. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, in Hearings on Mineral Development
of Federal Lands before Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on
Internal and Insular Affairs, Gov. Doe. No. Y4. In 8/13:M66/41, Item 1040 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings).
5. 30 U.S.C. §§181 et seq. (1970).
6. Hearings,supra note 4, at 164.
7. Act of July 31, 1947, ch. 406, 61 Stat. 681.
8. 30 U.S.C. §§601, 603, 611-15(1970).
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ment is that the Mining Law of 1872 is self-executing and does not
allow the Secretary of the Interior to weigh alternative public values,
which he may do under the other systems of development before
approving applications for title. Under the Mining Law of 1872 the
Secretary has utilized two basic approaches to deny the statutory
grant of rights in situations where he feels mineral development is
inconsistent with proper land use policy. First he may withdraw lands
from the domain of public land laws, rendering the Mining Law
inoperable. The second approach has been to apply increasingly
restrictive tests for the determination of value.
In the absence of Congressional reform of the Mining Law for the
disposition of hardrock minerals, the Department of the Interior,
through decisions rendered by the Secretary of the Interior until 1952,
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the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior from 1952 to 1970, and
the Board of Land Appeals since 1970, effected indirect reform
through increasingly strict interpretations of the Law. The terms
valuable and discovery in the 1872 Law were defined in the case
Castle v. Womble9, in what has subsequently become known as the
prudent man rule. 10 This rule indicates that there is value when a
"man of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in
developing a valuable mine. .."11 Although the language of Castle v.
Womble makes no explicit mention of profitability, the Department
of the Interior, in a long series of subsequent decisions, held that the
prudent man would take into account prospective profitability before
investing his labor and means.12 The marketability test of value, as it
came to be known, reached its final explication in United States v.
Coleman,13 with the Secretary's decision that present marketability at
a profit was required for discovery. Though the marketability test of
value may be deemed desirable by the Secretary for unstated social
purposes, it diverges significantly from the conventional economic test
in which value is associated with positive market prices.14 For
example, the title to low-grade copper deposits may be of substantial
value to those willing to speculate on rising prices in the future or on
the development of new techniques of extraction, yet the copper
deposit may be highly unprofitable should it be mined today.
The use of mining claims for purposes other than mining has been
extensive. 15 Under the Mining Law of 1872 the owner of a mining
claim has the right to disturb the surface in search for minerals,
including such acts as cutting timber and erecting structures necessary for mining operations. In some cases summer homes have been
built on otherwise worthless mining claims. 16 The owners face the risk
9. 19 L.D. 455 (1894).
10. See Reeves, The Orign and Development of the Rules of Discovery, 8 Land and Water
Review 1 (1973), for a discussion of the history of the rules and interpretations of discovery.
11. 19 L.D. 455,457(1894).
12. See Reeves supra Note 10, at 54, and also Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other
Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department's
Administrationof the Mining Law, 74 Colum. L. R. 1231 (1974).

13. 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
14. In an earlier era when land was abundant and other economic resources were scarce, it
may have made sense as public policy to give away public lands to encourage their
development. The trend toward stricter interpretations of the Mining Law may be viewed as
recognition that granting mining patents primarily served to redistribute wealth and did little to
stimulate mineral development and output.
15. One of the more egregious attempts to circumvent the intent of the Mining Law was the
claim filed at the head of the Bright Angel Trail in the Grand Canyon for the purposes of

extracting tolls from passersby, see Cameron v.U.S. 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
16. A thorough discussion of this abuse is given in Summer, Wilderness and the Mining Law,
Living Wilderness, Spring, 1973, at 8.
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that the Federal Government may challenge their claim on the
grounds that valuable minerals have not been found. If the challenge
is sustained the property reverts to government ownership. Others
have filed mining claims on land in the path of urban growth (as in the
thousands of claims for sand and gravel near Las Vegas) hoping to
profit from use of the land as a commercial site.
Mining claims, though filed for a specific mineral, convey the right
to remove other minerals. As relative mineral values change, old
claims may be challenged in state courts by those who would like to
obtain mining rights for other minerals. The challenge may be on the
grounds that the boundaries of the original claim were incorrectly
specified, that less than the requisite $100 effort has been done yearly,
that the valuable discovery has not been made, and a host of other
points.
The discovery procedure frequently serves to retard the production
of minerals. The area surrounding the site of a major discovery usually
becomes dotted with other speculative claims which may hinder
further development. Not only is it expensive to negotiate with so
many different claimants, but each one has an incentive to hold out
for a disproportionate share of anticipated future profits. Dormant
mining claims serve as a deterrent to new exploration because of the
significant costs of having them declared invalid.
Development of a mining property involves capital requirements
on a scale which normally requires access to financial markets.
Because of risk reduction through diversification of activities, the
larger mining companies are able to obtain financing on more
favorable terms than would the lone prospector. Capital requirements
force the owners of any undeveloped mining claims to solicit offers
from the major mining companies if the properties are ever to reach
have obtained
the producing stage. The larger mining companies
17
fashion.
this
in
property
producing
their
of
much
Prospecting on closed (private) land differs from that on public
open access land in that some bonus, lease, or royalty is normally
arranged before prospecting begins. The landlord captures some of
the rent and prospecting is less motivated. Another factor which tends
to limit exploration on private lands is that the rational landowner
would want to postpone exploration effort in the hope that exploration on adjoining properties would reveal information as to the
mineral content of his property.
A third land tenure arrangement has evolved on former public
17. The Vice President of Anaconda reported that of their mines in current production only

one had been discovered by Anaconda. See Hearings,supra note 4, at 272-73.
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domain lands where surface rights have been disposed of through
statute. The separation of surface and mineral rights on these lands
has led to a number of unfortunate situations where mineral
exploration and even mining occurs in residential areas.
Factors other than the General Mining Law which affect industry
decisions on the timing of and investment in exploration include the
nature of competition in the industry and Federal and state tax policy
toward the mineral industry. The industry setting of imperfect
competition serves to stimulate preclusive preemption to the industry
base to strengthen competitive positions. Firms place a high value on
the discovery of resources because they may later be rewarded by
monopoly rents. Vertically integrated firms often attempt to gain
control of raw material supplies. Mancke observed this tendency in
the steel industry in the late nineteenth century. The apparent
motivation of the steel producers was to prevent the formation of an
iron ore cartel that might threaten the profitability enjoyed by the
steel industry. 18
Federal tax policy appears to operate to stimulate exploration,
though a comprehensive review of the effects is beyond the scope of
this paper. On balance the expensing of exploration and development
expenditures serves as an interest-free loan from the treasury in the
amount of the deductions, when one compares this policy with the
alternative of treating such outlays as investments. Though Miller has
argued that percent depletion discourages exploration, it would
appear that by making mineral discoveries more valuable, percent
depletion would serve to stimulate exploration effort. 19
The effect of the property tax on exploration deserves special
consideration. Mining claims are not subject to a property tax until
they are patented. Minerals can be removed from unpatented claims,
making the impact of property taxes on exploratory efforts on open
public lands minimal. On private lands property taxes may be revised
upward following mineral discovery. This factor may serve to reduce
the incentive to explore. The administration of property taxes is an
extraordinarily complex subject involving thousands of rates, districts,
and administrative decisions. Any impact of property taxes on
exploration efforts could be minimized by reducing taxes on properties where mineral production is uneconomic, while raising it in
successful properties.
18. R. Mancke. The American Iron Ore and Steel Industries: Two Essays (1969, unpublished
dissertation at M.I.T.).
19. See Miller, Percent Depletion and the Level of Domestic Mineral Production, 15 Nat. Res.
J. 241, 253 (1975).
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ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPTIMIZATION

IN EXPLORATION
There are two basic tests of the social desirability of the discovery
process. First, is exploration effort timed in a manner that is
consistent with national policy objectives? Second, are inputs to the
discovery process used efficiently? Because there is little, if any,
governmental regulation or other form of influence on the timing of
exploration, there may be a divergence between decisions made by
the mining industry and national policy objectives. The legal setting
of open access favors the inefficient use of exploration inputs; in
addition, the decentralized and often lax recording of claims needlessly increases discovery costs.
That exploration should precede production by many years is
suggested by information requirements regarding the quality and
extent of domestic ore supplies which would be an input to the
development of a national materials policy. Additionally, if the
commencement of production is to be optimally timed, the values of
all mineral leases and claims should be accurately known. This is
difficult in the face of the tremendous uncertainty which precedes
thorough exploration. Certainly the reticence of the mining industry
to reveal the true extent of propable reserves compounds the difficulty
of making Federal mineral policies. A factor which argues against
complete knowledge of reserves. is that idle reserves in and of
themselves are not productive. If social welfare is to be measured
strictly by output, society would be better off to defer exploration
outlays until just before production is scheduled to begin, and channel
investment funds into productive areas in the interim. Moreover, as
technological improvement in exploration continues, the real costs of
discovery should decline, further arguing for a slowing of the pace of
exploration. As long as the timing of exploration is controlled by
mining firms rather than subject to some form of central control, there
is a strong chance timing will be premature from the viewpoint of
society as a whole. Rather than being motivated by national policy
objectives the individual firms are stimulated to explore by profitmaximizing considerations. Individual profit-maximizing behavior
fails to maximize societal welfare both when the rate at which future
profits are discounted by individuals differs from the social rate of
discount, and when individuals are induced to explore in order to
strengthen market positions.
The second question to consider is efficiency in exploration. In
theory, and ignoring considerations of risk, inputs to any production
process should continue to be hired so long as the value of their
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marginal product continues to exceed their cost. For mineral
exploration there is no central authority with the responsibility for
determining the marginal productivity of additional prospecting
effort. Individuals are guided in their decision to prospect by the
expected (average) wage in the industry (or may be willing to accept
even less if they are attracted by the remote prospect of a big strike).
Assuming diminishing returns to prospectors as a result of a decline in
the quality of lands being searched, the average wage will exceed the
incremental value of the contribution to total discovery value made
by the last few prospectors.2 0 These marginal prospectors, though
themselves earning the average wage, depress the incomes of the
earlier entrants to the field, so that in terms of their net contribution
to discoveries their effort is unjustified. 21 Again individual profitmaximizing decisions lead to a lower level of social welfare than
would occur under centralized management of exploration.
Although we have in principle answered the question of the
optimal amount of prospecting effort, there exist a number of possible
externalities which could alter the conditions for optimality. They
include:
(1) An information externality in that one discovery may make
it easier to find minerals in the same or similar geological
formations.
(2) An exploration externality resulting from duplication of
effort-searching the same land more than once.
In commenting on these externalities we note that a beneficial
externality, such as the first, would require the optimal exploration
effort to be greater than indicated by the marginal productivity
criterion, whereas a negative externality, such as the second, would
indicate the criterion calls for excessive exploration. The third
externality deserves special consideration. It is true that each
successive discovery raises the cost of subsequent discoveries,
especially in the absence of externalities of the first type. If one views
exploration as a sequential searching process, identical prospecting
efforts in successive years will be expected to yield progressively
lower returns. This is merely the famous pecuniary externality where
firms face a rising supply curve for an input (mineral reserves) and
20. As Worcester has noted, a price of zero on one input (unclaimed mineral deposits in this
case) creates a technological externality in that prospecting efforts expand beyond the point
where the marginal product of labor is zero. In equilibrium the average returns to prospecting
are just sufficient to keep firms in the industry. See Worcester, Pecuniary and Technological
Externality, FactorRents, and Social Cost, 59 Am. Econ. Rev. 875 (1969).
21. This point has been made in F. Peterson, Two Externalities in Petroleum Exploration,
Studies in Energy Tax Policy (Brannon ed. 1975) and in W. Schulze, The Optimal Use of
Non-Renewable Resources: The Theory of Extraction, 1 J.Env. Econ. Mgt. 53 (1974).
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appropriation of the input by one firm raises the cost to subsequent
users. As such it does not result in a misallocation of resources and
calls for no deviation from the optimality criterion.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPTIMIZATION
IN PRODUCTION
In theory (and probably in practice) the production of minerals by
corporations is governed by the maximization of the present value of
profits from a mine. 22 Thus production decisions are affected by
profitability variables such as taxation, ore grade, mineral prices, and
extraction technology, all of which are factors unrelated to the
operation of the General Mining Law. The primary, if not the only,
function of the General Mining Law is control over the process by
which the ownership of minerals in place is transferred from public to
private hands. As argued below, the neutrality of the Mining Law
with respect to production decisions permits the attainment of the
same social welfare optimum that would result from the unrestricted
activities of individual mining companies. Most recent proposals to
revise the Mining Law would affect production decisions, either
through taxation, royalties on leaseholds, or requirements that
production commence within a stated period to maintain rights to a
leasehold. This section examines the impact of taxation and other
regulatory mechanisms on the production decisions of mining firms as
a prelude to the critical evaluation of the proposals to revise the
Mining Law.
Maximization of the present value of producer's plus consumer's
surplus will be used as the criterion of optimality in production. This
choice may appear a bit artificial, but it has been used previously in
intertemporal models, and as Peterson shows, it is equivalent to
efficiency in the more conventional terms of price and marginal
cost. 23 Hotelling first demonstrated the efficiency of a competitive
mining industry.24 He showed that a competitive industry which
22. In a qualitative discussion of mineral conservation, Montgomery has suggested that the
maximization of private economic returns is too narrow a criterion of optimality. He argues that
present recovery techniques are often needlessly wasteful and that society ought to consider
mineral recovery techniques along with other social, economic, and environmental benefits in
making decisions regarding mineral production. See Montgomery, Conservation in Mineral
Development: Why Be Concerned? Thirty-Ninth N. Am. Wildlife and Nat. Res. Conf., (1974).
23. F. Peterson, The Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources: A Classical Variational
Approach (1972, unpublished dissertation at Princeton Univ.).
24. H. Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. of Pol. Econ. 137 (1931). It
should be noted that Hotelling wrote long before technological externalities became a
fashionable subject for inquiry, and he did not incorporate them into his model. With such
externalities the result no longer holds; a competitive mining industry falls to achieve
optimality.
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maximizes the present value of profits chooses exactly the same
production path as a centrally planned economy which maximizes the
present value of producer's plus consumer's surplus. A monopolistically controlled industry would fail to achieve optimality by maintaining
a difference between price and marginal cost. Compared with the
centrally planned economy's production path the monopolist restricts
output.
In the competitive model firms maximize the present value of
profits, which is the present value of producer's surplus (the difference
between price and long-run marginal cost), and may properly be
termed economic rent when marginal cost measures the opportunity
cost of each input. Economists have long argued that taxation of rent
is socially desirable, such taxes being non-distorting. Additionally one
might argue that mineral production on public lands should not earn
long-run profits above the minimum necessary to attract the investment that does take place. Equity with respect to the allocation of
public resources would indicate that some (the mining companies)
should not benefit at the expense of the many.
We are led to an examination of the effect of various forms of
taxation on the allocation of rents and on the optimal timing of
production. Hotelling and Peterson both analyzed the impact of
taxation on production. Their results are summarized below. A pure
profits tax is a tax on economic rents; it does not distort the timing of
production from that which is socially optimal. The income tax
distorts production decisions because of the manner in which
investment is treated. Rather than being written off as incurred,
investment for exploration and development of productive ventures
must be capitalized and depreciated over time. The depletion
allowance as it is written in the tax code serves to accelerate the
timing of production over what it would be with ordinary income
taxation. In recent sessions of Congress hearings have been held on
legislation that would impose a Federal severance tax or royalty
payment on output. A severance tax would have the consequence of
postponing output and would also serve to transfer some of the
economic rent to the Federal government.
Tax

Effect on Timing of Production

pure profits
income
severance
property

neutral
delayed
delayed
advance or neutral
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Taxes such as royalties and severance taxes serve to lessen the
differential in value between the use of land for mineral production
and some alternative purpose, even if the alternative use is merely to
serve the needs of an occasional hiker or hunter. As long as the land
continues to be used for mineral production the government obtains a
share of the rent that previously accrued to the owner of the land. By
applying royalties or severances to the gross value of output, the
extensive margin of land use for mineral production will be curtailed.2 5 A tax on net receipts (accounting profits) would be better in
that more profitable operations would pay larger taxes per ton of ore
removed, but better still would be a tax on pure economic profit
(rent). In theory this would be administered by taxing only that
portion of profits from each operation above that which reflects a
normal rate of return on the investment (properly adjusted for risk).
REVISING THE MINING LAW OF 1872
Significant modification of the General Mining Law occurred with
the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Acts of 1920 and 194726 and the
Material Disposal Law of 1947. 27 The former served to exclude most
energy minerals from location through the Mining Law, and the latter
provided for the sale of common materials such as sand, gravel, and
clay obtained on public lands at fair market value. The wisdom of
having three separate systems for the development of minerals on
Federal lands is questionable, especially considering that the minerals
subject to disposal under different systems may be intermingled in the
same deposit. The Multiple Mineral Development Act 28 was an
explicit attempt to deal with this problem of administration. The
passage of the National Wilderness Areas Preservation Act 2 9 and the
30
establishment of the Public Land Law Review Commission
presaged a revival of interest in an examination of the desirability of
the Mining Law as an instrument of national policy.
Most of the land that was placed in wilderness status by the
National Wilderness Areas Preservation Act had been open to mining
and in many areas claims had been filed and even patented. Rather
than halt all current mining efforts or deny rights that had already
been conferred through patenting, Congress opted to allow prospect25. This point is repeatedly made in the testimony of various mining associations. David
Cole, Secretary of the Colorado Mining Association, in Hearings, supra note 4, at 280, asserts
that a royalty is counterproductive because it increases the cutoff grade.
26. 30 U.S.C. §181 (1970); and 30 U.S.C. §§351-90 (1970).
27. 61 Stat. 681, supra note 7.

28. 30 U.S.C. §§521-31 (1970).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970).
30. 43 U.S.C. § 1392 (1970).
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ing and mining until January 1, 1984, presumably a sufficient time to
allow fixed investments to be recovered. The Act specifies that it is
Federal policy "to secure for the American people of present and
future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilder1
ness." 3
The act establishing the Public Land Law Review Commission
states:
[I]t is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress that the public
lands of the United States shall be (a) retained and managed, or (b)
disposed of, all in 32
a manner to provide the maximum benefit for
the general public.
By this declaration Congress reinforced the trend away from what
some have viewed as indiscriminate disposal of Federal lands under
such laws as the Homestead Law 33 and the General Mining Law. As
land became more scarce, disposal as an instrument of public policy
gave way to leasing and sale through competitive bidding. The open
access to minerals on public lands is one of the few remaining vestiges
of our former national policy.
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 excluded most energy minerals
from location and provided for the awarding of lease privileges
through competitive bidding. By leasing, rather than allowing open
access, the dissipation of economic rent through excessive and
premature exploration can be eliminated. Presumably the Interior
Department can weigh the social benefits from alternative uses of
Federal lands before it decides to offer them for lease. Also the
regulation of mining activity is simplified if tracts are large and
records of ownership are kept in a single location. The welfare of
future generations may or may not be factored into governmental
decisons, but at least there is reason to believe it will be given more
weight than in private decisions to explore when open access is
allowed. Uncertainties associated with possible withdrawal of exploration rights still exist as a deterrent to prospecting effort and may
serve to adversely affect bidding for oil and gas leases.
The principal defect of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, from the
viewpoint of economic efficiency, is the manner in which production
leases are awarded for lands not known to be mineralized. The Act
specifi4s that parties interested in obtaining a noncompetitive oil or
gas lease must file simultaneously, the winner to be chosen in a
random drawing. Typically, parties awarded the leases are not in the
petroleum industry and sell the lease to one of the major petroleum
31. 16 U.S.C. §1131(a) (1970).
32. 43 U.S.C. §1391 (1970).
33. 43 U.S.C. §§161 et seq. (1970).
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companies in a contract that provides for a royalty to the seller. No
part of this royalty accrues to the Federal government (other than
through income taxation.) This system encourages excessive investment in the socially nonproductive act of filing for the leases. Social
welfare would be increased if this nonproductive effort was
discouraged and a system of competitive bidding established (as is
done for lands known to be mineralized).
The leasing process for coal and phosphates requires that they often
be granted without competition, a system that may, depending upon
leasing fees, transfer economic rent from the Federal government to
private investors.
At least four bills were introduced recently in Congress that would
modify the operation of the Mining Law of 1872 as it pertains to
hardrock minerals. These are S 1040, the proposed "Mineral Leasing
Act of 1973;" S 3085, the proposed "Hardrock Mineral Development
Act of 1974," S 3086, the proposed "Mineral Development Act of
1974;" and HR 8435, the proposed "Mineral Leasing Act of 1975."
The following paragraphs outline the provisions of each of these bills
and analyze their efficacy in producing socially desirable changes in
the Mining Law.
S 1040, which was supported by the Administration and the
Interior Department and strongly opposed by the organized mining
interests, would have repealed the Mining Law of 1872, the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920, and related laws, and in their place would have:
(1) Instituted a system of leasing for the exploration of all
minerals. The leases would have been issued by competitive bid
only when there was evidence of minerals in paying quantities;
otherwise leases would have been issued without charge, and
would have been valid for a period of ten years.
(2) Instituted a second type of lease for production, valid for
from five to twenty years and automatically renewable if minerals
were being produced.
(3) Established minimum annual rental fees per acre on all
leases.
(4) Established a minimum royalty on production.
(5) Required submission of plans for operation and reclamation
prior to commencement of mining, and compliance with these
plans throughout.
(6) Given the Secretary of the Interior the authority to remove
lands from the operation of the Act to protect the environment or
to promote alternative uses of the land, and also given the
Secretary the right to waive or reduce fees and royalties on
certain properties to encourage development.
(7) Limited hardrock mineral leaseholdings under control of
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one corporation to 20,480 acres in one state and 640 acres in one
lease.

(8) Required that all existing claims be recorded within one
year of enactment of the Act and a patent applied for within three
years.
If properly implemented by the Secretary of the Interior, this bill
would have corrected the major objections previously raised to the
Mining Law of 1872. Timing of exploration would have been under
centralized management, and with restrictions on entry there would
have been far less of an incentive to excessive exploration effort. With
entry restrictions on a lease, decentralized prospecting decisions are
(theoretically, at least) guided by a prospector's marginal product, a
force that should lead to efficient use of prospecting inputs. Uncertainties over ownership would have been resolved. Larger leases
should eliminate the externalities associated with excessive adjacent
claim filing near productive discoveries. Control over use and the
evaluation of alternative land uses would have rested with the
Secretary, who presumably would make decisions consistent with the
maximization of social welfare.
Contrary to the remarks of Howard Edwards of the Anaconda
Company that offering leases through competitive bidding, as
proposed by this bill, ". . . is not a fair way to allocate leases because
the practice discriminates against small miners, is an economic waste,
discourages development and investment. . ."34, the taxation of true
economic rent (as in a bid for a lease) is desirable because it serves to
allocate investment according to the marginal productivity criterion.
It is true that bidding for leases can involve substantial sums and this
factor would definitely serve to deter the small prospector. In the past
the small prospector has been instrumental in the discovery process;
Koehler Stout, President of the Montana Mining Congress, terms
them the "bird dogs" of the industry.3 5 If their efforts truly are more
productive than similar outlays by large mining companies, the
interests of both prospectors and mining companies would be served
by formalizing their relationship in an employment contract (containing suitable incentives for discovery).
The Hardrock Mineral Development Act of 1974, S 3085, is similar
to S 1040 with the following exceptions:
(1) It would have applied only to hardrock minerals.
(2) It did not specify guidelines for competitive bidding on
leases.
34. Hearings, supra note 4, at 268.
35. Id., at 286.
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(3) It did not specify that the Secretary would have discretion
over the issuance of exploration leases.
(4) Production leases could have been held for 40 years without
any production as compared to 20 years under S 1040.
The differences between S 3085 and S 1040 were primarily in the
scope of coverage and the authority vested in the Secretary. The
economic implications are clear. Inefficiencies in other than hardrock
mineral exploration and production would not necessarily be subject
to evaluation by a centralized decisionmaking unit. Also the absence
of competitive bidding for leases would result in a loss of economic
rent to society and its appropriation by the winner of the lease.
The proposed Mineral Development Act of 1974, S 3086, was
preferred by the American Mining Congress, an association of large
mining companies, and was opposed by (1) various smaller associations representing lesser mining companies for whom capital
requirements would have been burdensome, and (2) the Department
of the Interior. Among other things this Act would have:
(1) Provided for the elimination of existing unpatented claims
unless a new claim was filed within five years of the date of
enactment of the Act.
(2) Had new claims recorded both in the county recording
office and in the regional office of the Bureau of Land Management, and filed for 80 acres in a manner that conforms with legal
subdivisions of public land.
(3) Eliminated the present distinction between lode and placer
claims.
(4) Increased the annual labor requirements substantially.
(5) Continued the present system of patenting, though only at a
substantially higher fee. Patents would have only conferred the
right to extract minerals and would not have allowed full freedom
to utilize the site for other purposes as is the case under present
law.
(6) Instituted a system of royalties of 2% of the value of

minerals mined subject to the restriction the royalty be less than
5%of net income.
This bill would have resolved many of the ambiguities over
ownership by eliminating all old claims for which there was no
current active interest. By collecting all claim information in a
central repository (BLM), potential claimants should enjoy significantly lower search costs in determining whether or not a given parcel has
been claimed. Presumably the provisions restricting use of patented
sites to only those directly connected with the production of minerals
would have eliminated the abuses that have occurred on these sites.
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The provisions for environmental protection in these bills differed
substantially in degree. S 1040 would have had the most stringent
requirements, the operation and reclamation plans which would have
had to have been approved, before development and followed
thereafter. S 3085 would have been less restrictive by not requiring
such comprehensive planning, nor would it specifically have vested
authority in the Secretary to reject the issuance of exploration leases
or bids for leases when he felt it was in the public interest to do so, as
he could under S 1040. S 3086 would have given the Secretary even
less authority to deal with problems of multiple use and environmental damage.
HR 8435, the proposed Mineral Leasing Act of 1975, was drafted
largely by Lawrence MacDonald, a Colorado School of Mines
professor of economics. This bill would revise the entire system for
mineral disposal including hardrock minerals, oil and gas, construction materials, and bedded minerals such as oil shale and sulfur. The
existing systems would be replaced by a three-stage leasing system in
which the Federal government would retain ownership and control
over the land. Strong environmental safeguards would accompany
each stage. Inasmuch as the principal concern of this paper is
hardrock mineral development under the General Mining Law, the
discussion of HR 8435 will deal primarily with the regulation of
hardrock mineral development.
In stage one the Secretary of the Interior would, at his discretion,
issue a prospecting permit allowing only surface reconnaissance to
any person making a valid application. Each permit would be valid
for a period of two years and would be subject to a nominal fee to
cover administrative costs.
In stage two exploration leases would be issued which would give
exclusive exploration rights to the leaseholder. Where two or more
persons file exploration applications on substantially overlapping
territory, the Secretary would offer the lease competitively to the
highest bidder. A rental fee of at least 50o per acre per year would be
charged; the size of each lease would be limited to a maximum of 640
acres; and the extraction of minerals would be limited to quantities
required for chemical analysis.
In the third stage a development and production lease would be
issued by the Secretary to persons showing that deposits exist in
paying quantities. Lease applications would be able to be revised to
include other minerals should they be discovered during subsequent
development. Leases would be issued for a twenty-year term and
continue thereafter as long as production continued. A fee of at least
$1 per acre per year would be imposed and the fee would be
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increased each year following the sixth if production had not
commenced. Before extraction operations could begin a comprehensive plan for operations and reclamation would have to be approved
by the Secretary.
Holders of existing mining claims would be forced to record them
within one year of the date of the Act, and to file an application for a
patent or a development lease within three years of recordation of the
claim.
HR 8435 would eliminate most of the undesirable features of
discovery under the General Mining Law. Furthermore, the imposition of strong environmental controls in an area so conspicuously
lacking in controls must be viewed favorably. Despite these desirable
features, distortions in the intertemporal allocation of resources could
result from the pressure that would be placed on prospectors to bring
mines on stream at an early date.
A rational mining firm maximizing the present value of its profits
would begin development of a deposit when the return earned on
holding the undeveloped deposit just equalled the return available on
alternative investments-that is, when the rate of increase in value of
a deposit equals the market rate of interest. As Hotelling showed, the
profit-maximizing activities of a competitive mining industry would
maximize societal welfare. When a regulatory system is instituted
which imposes penalties for delaying development, the mining firms
having development and production leases on marginally valuable
deposits are forced to accelerate the timing of production if they
want to avoid losing their rights under the lease. Such penalty provisions may indeed stimulate mining activity in the near future, but
only at the cost of denying these minerals to future generations. The
production incentives are undesirable because they would distort
what are, in principle, decisions consistent with the maximization
of social welfare.
CONCLUSION
The mineral discovery process on open Federal lands has been
shown to suffer from a number of defects, the severity of which has
not been assessed. It would appear that a strong, plausible argument
can be made that centralized management or control over mineral
exploration is desirable, from the viewpoints of both efficiency and
control over the timing of prospecting effort. If national mineral
policy is to continue to allow open access, we must ask who benefits
from such a policy, and what is it costing the nation. Open access is
essentially a form of public subsidization of prospecting. Prospectors

July 19761

FEDERAL MINERAL POLICY

receive revenues that would accrue to the Federal treasury in a
leasing system. Although it may well be deemed appropriate to
publicly subsidize exploration, open access is a poor mechanism
through which to transmit this subsidy. Because the inefficient use of
common property resources is a familiar and ubiquitous occurrence,
subsidies such as governmental sponsorship of seismic surveys, assays
of the mineralization of aquifers, and research on mining and milling
technology, combined with a system of leasing, would favor efficient
use of scarce resources, and thus be preferable to the discovery system
with open access.
A second form of inefficiency in the claim-filing process creates
uncertainty over the existence and authenticity of claims, needlessly
raising the cost of exploration. That such a policy wastes resources has
been recognized by the mining industry and is reflected in its
enthusiastic support of proposals to eliminate all claims for which
there is no current active interest.
Inasmuch as all of the bills that were reviewed here contain a
provision for taxation, it appears that governmental policy makers
favor, and the mining industry is willing to accede to, some accrual of
rents to the Federal treasury. Unfortunately that tax provision in each
of the bills is nearly identical in basing royalties or severance taxes on
the value of gross output rather than on economic rent. Such taxes are
distorting in that they affect both investment and production decisions. Perhaps in the broader context of conserving minerals for the
use of future generations, a severance tax could be justified, but even
then taxation of economic rents would be desirable.
Although a compelling case for a revision of Federal mineral policy
can be made on both allocative (efficiency) and distributional (equity)
grounds, the actual gains, if any, from such policy changes are
unknown. The growing tendency for exploration to be conducted by
larger firms lessens the chance of externalities due to needless
duplication of effort. The fact that only eleven patents were issued in
1973 certainly indicates that exploration activity is probably not as
intense as it once was. It is possible that the costs of administering a
leasing system would outweigh any gains achieved through the
efficient allocation of inputs to exploration. Based on existing
evidence it would be foolhardy to predict which of the proposed
revisions would be the best public policy. Furthermore an interesting
alternative-public management of all exploration, with sale at
competitive bidding of leases to promising discoveries-may in fact be
preferable to any of the current proposals. We would suggest that
more thorough research on the above issues may be the best public
policy over the near term.

